CAPPS II is a system purportedly used to combat terrorism on commercial airline flights. As the name of the program indicates, CAPPS II is intended to prescreen airline passengers to make sure individuals who pose a risk to airline safety do not board planes. The list of suspected and potentially dangerous passengers is maintained by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA).
CAPPS II arose from the CAPPS program, which was originally controlled by the FBI and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). CAPPS was formed in response to several incidents, including TWA Flight 800 and the Centennial Olympic Park bombing. But, in November 2001, jurisdiction over the program was transferred from the FBI and FAA to the TSA.
In 2003, the TSA proposed CAPPS II, which would have expanded their powers extensively and represented a huge risk to privacy. CAPPS II, supposedly more thorough, had several requirements set by Congress:
- Every airline and airport must be covered by the system.
- The government must administer the system.
- Every passenger with a ticket must go through the prescreening process.
CAPPS II relied on the use of Personal Name Record (PNR), in which information such as name and address is retained. This information, then, is checked against other databases, such as the No-Fly List. Based on what is found, the individual is given a risk score and may have to endure more extensive security checks based on their score. If the individual who is screened is either on a terrorist or most-wanted list or has outstanding warrants for a violent crime, law enforcement officials are contacted.
Clearly, permitting the government to have access to the personal information of every individual that boards a plane is a privacy risk. It’s one thing for the airlines to have personal information, because an individual voluntarily discloses personal information to airlines. However, the individual is not voluntarily disclosing personal information to the government; the government coerces the airline industry to acquire personal information and, violate privacy.
CAPPS II actually expanded the information originally collected by PNR. Additionally, date of birth and telephone number were collected by CAPPS II. Due to the privacy violations and invasiveness of this scheme, many privacy advocacy groups opposed CAPPS II, as did the General Accountability Office. In 2004, CAPPS II was cancelled.
For more information, see the links below:
A Press Release on CAPPS II by DHS in 2003
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=3163
People for the American Way on the risks of CAPPS II
http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/default.aspx?oid=13376
EPIC on CAPPS II and Travel Privacy
http://www.epic.org/privacy/airtravel/profiling.html
